Libs of TikTok doxes North Carolina nurse over Pretti/Renée Good post, tags state nursing board

What happened

In late January 2026, a North Carolina nurse posted a critical comment online about federal agents involved in the Minneapolis killings of Alex Pretti and Renée Good. The comment, quoted in coverage by The Advocate and LGBTQ Nation, read: "The agents who put [Pretti] in harm's way better pray they never end up in a hospital, the nurses won't be kind."

Chaya Raichik, who operates the Libs of TikTok accounts, surfaced the comment. She screenshotted it, attached the nurse's photo, and reposted to her multi-million-follower audience. The repost tagged the nurse's hospital employer. It also tagged the North Carolina Board of Nursing, with a call to revoke his license.

The same Libs of TikTok account has been linked by NBC News to a documented wave of bomb threats against schools, hospitals, and libraries the account publicly targeted in 2023 and 2024.

How it started

Pretti and Renée Good were killed in Minneapolis in January 2026 in incidents involving federal agents. The Renée Good shooting was the same event that triggered the DHS whistleblower data dump that fed ICE List days later. The Pretti and Good story has now produced multiple downstream incidents on this site.

The nurse's comment was one of thousands of critical posts about federal involvement in the killings. Raichik's role was selection and amplification. She picked the post, attached an identity, and tagged the institutions positioned to punish him.

Why this case matters

This is doxxing through a professional licensing body. It's a distinct retaliation vector and existing statutes do not reach it.

The defensive layers most first responders rely on assume the threat moves through home address publication, online harassment, or physical action at the residence. This incident skipped all of that. The threat moved through the state board that controls whether he can keep working. The hospital was tagged in the same breath. The intended punishment was occupational, not physical, and the channel was a regulatory complaint pipeline that exists to protect the public.

Three things matter here.

The amplifier had reach. A Substack post or a small-account screenshot would have stayed local. A multi-million-follower repost lands the complaint in the inbox of a state licensing board within hours.

The licensing channel is real. Nursing boards, EMS certification boards, medical boards, and bar associations all run complaint intake that any member of the public can use. They were built for patient-safety concerns, not for political retaliation campaigns. The complaint volume from a coordinated repost is a separate operational load on the board.

The corpus laws do not cover this. Anti-doxxing statutes target address publication. State privacy laws cover state-held records. Neither addresses the use of a licensing-board complaint as a coordinated harassment lever.

What this means for you

If you're a nurse, EMT, paramedic, doctor, sheriff's deputy, or any first responder who works under a state license, the licensing board is a parallel attack surface. Broker removal does not reach it. The corpus laws do not reach it.

Two practical layers help.

Keep the personal data off the broker pages so a Libs of TikTok-style repost cannot also push your home address into the same audience. We do that work. North Carolina has no Daniel's Law analog. The state's public-records exemption (G.S. 132-1.10) covers state-held records, not broker republication or licensing-board threads.

Before posting on social media in any context that could be screenshot and reframed as a threat, talk to your union or licensing-defense counsel. The retaliation vector this incident proved is not a hypothetical anymore.

For more on the broader doxxing chain, see /doxxing. For the upstream Renée Good connection, see the ICE List DHS data leak page.

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