Libs of TikTok doxes North Carolina nurse over Pretti/Renée Good post, tags state nursing board

What happened

In late January 2026, a North Carolina nurse posted a critical comment online about federal agents involved in the Minneapolis killings of Alex Pretti and Renée Good. The comment, quoted in coverage by The Advocate and LGBTQ Nation, read: "The agents who put [Pretti] in harm's way better pray they never end up in a hospital, the nurses won't be kind."

Chaya Raichik, who operates the Libs of TikTok accounts, surfaced the comment. She screenshotted it, attached the nurse's photo, and reposted it to her audience of millions. The repost tagged the nurse's hospital employer. It also tagged the North Carolina Board of Nursing, with a call to revoke his license.

According to Media Matters, the nurse was one of several teachers, nurses, and other workers Raichik named, photographed, and tied to an employer over posts supporting Pretti or opposing ICE. The same account has been linked by NBC News to at least 33 instances since 2020 — 21 of them bomb threats — in which schools, libraries, hospitals, businesses, and officials it had singled out later reported threats or violent intimidation, across 16 states.

As of the coverage reviewed, no nursing-board action against the nurse and no response from his hospital have been publicly reported.

How it started

Renée Good was shot and killed by a federal immigration agent in Minneapolis on January 7, 2026. Alex Pretti, a Department of Veterans Affairs intensive-care nurse, was shot and killed by Customs and Border Protection officers there on January 24, 2026. Both were U.S. citizens, and both deaths drew widespread protest and later federal and state scrutiny. The killing of Renée Good also connects to the DHS data leak that fed the ICE List, covered separately on this site.

The nurse's comment was one of thousands of critical posts about federal involvement in the killings. Raichik's role was selection and amplification. She picked the post, attached an identity, and tagged the institutions positioned to punish him.

Why this case matters

This is doxxing routed through a professional licensing board. Existing statutes do not reach it.

Most privacy defenses assume the threat moves through a published home address, online harassment, or someone showing up at the house. This one did not. It moved through the state board that decides whether the nurse can keep working, and his hospital was tagged alongside it. The pressure ran toward his job, not his front door, and it traveled through a public complaint process built to protect patients.

The reach is what made it land. A small-account screenshot stays local. A repost to millions of followers can flood a state licensing board's inbox with complaints.

The complaint channel is real and open to anyone. Nursing boards, EMS certification boards, medical boards, and bar associations all take complaints from the public. They exist for patient-safety and misconduct concerns, not political retaliation, but nothing stops a coordinated wave of complaints from using them.

The privacy laws that exist do not cover this. Anti-doxxing statutes target the publication of an address. State privacy laws cover records the state itself holds. Neither one addresses using a licensing-board complaint as a harassment tool.

What this means for you

If you work under a state license — nurse, EMT, paramedic, doctor, or sworn officer — the licensing board is a separate route of attack. Broker removal does not reach it, and neither do the current privacy laws.

Keeping your personal data off the broker pages still matters. If a repost like this one surfaces, it should not also be able to push your home address to the same audience. North Carolina has no Daniel's Law analog — the New Jersey law that lets covered officials demand data brokers delete their home address and phone number — and no law that forces data brokers to remove a resident's information. Its public-records protections are narrow. They redact identifiers like Social Security numbers from state records, not broker listings or licensing-board threads.

The second step is not a data problem. Before posting anything online that could be screenshotted and reframed as a threat, talk to your union or a licensing-defense attorney. This case showed the retaliation route is real, not hypothetical.

Frontline Privacy files removal requests with data brokers, which addresses the broker layer but not the licensing-board channel.

For the broader doxxing pattern, see /doxxing.