ICE List publishes personal data on roughly 4,500 more ICE, Border Patrol, and DHS employees in January 2026 leak

What happened

ICE List launched in June 2025. It is run by Dominick Skinner, an Irish immigration activist living in the Netherlands, and hosted outside U.S. jurisdiction. Before January 2026 the site had published the names of about 2,000 ICE and Border Patrol employees. Much of that came from public sources, including LinkedIn profiles the employees had posted themselves.

On January 7, 2026, an ICE agent fatally shot Renée Good, a 37-year-old woman, in Minneapolis. Days later, the site's operator told The Daily Beast that a Department of Homeland Security whistleblower had helped him obtain personal data on roughly 4,500 more people connected to ICE. The records included names, work email addresses, phone numbers, job titles, and other background information. Not every identity was published.

Coverage by Wikipedia's ICE List entry and the related DHS employee data leak article reported that the material published across both waves has included names, phone numbers, and in some cases home addresses.

DHS condemned the leak. The site stayed online, hosted outside U.S. jurisdiction.

How it started

The June 2025 launch and the January 2026 expansion ran on the same model: insider or public data, offshore hosting, and automated matching to verify identities.

The verification piece is the part worth understanding. The operator has said a three-person team uses automated matching to check names against the records before publishing, filtering duplicates and obvious errors. That is what lets the effort scale from a handful of names to thousands.

Hours after the January release, the site was hit by a denial-of-service attack meant to knock it offline. The source was widely speculated to be Russian. The operator said the use of proxies made the origin impossible to confirm. The attack did not take the site down for long.

The downstream amplification runs through the commercial broker stack. Once a name is published on ICE List, people-search and reverse-lookup sites can be used to pull the home address attached to that name. The data the site published, mainly names and contact details, is the same class of information that gets aggregated and resold every day for anyone whose name is known.

Why this case matters

Most reporting on the doxxing of federal officers covers one officer at a time. ICE List collapsed the exposure for thousands of agents and staff into a single publication. Anyone with a grievance and an internet connection can take a name off the list and run it through the standard broker stack to find a home address. That step takes no technical skill.

Separately, DHS has said assaults on ICE personnel rose sharply over the same period, citing increases above 1,000 percent. Those figures are contested: an NPR review of court records found a smaller rise than the department's public numbers suggest. Those counts cover field enforcement encounters, and no public reporting has tied ICE List to a specific assault, so treat the two as separate problems rather than one driving the other. Either way, the structural problem with the leak is clear. The source is internal, the hosting is offshore, the verification is automated, and the amplification runs on commercial broker sites. None of those pieces are ones a federal agency can fully close on its own.

Sen. Marsha Blackburn introduced S. 1952, the Protecting Law Enforcement from Doxxing Act, in June 2025, before this leak, in response to the doxxing of federal officers. The bill would make it a federal crime to publish a federal officer's name with intent to obstruct an investigation or immigration operation. Free-speech groups have criticized it as too broad. It has not become law.

What this means for you

If you are an ICE agent, Border Patrol officer, or any DHS employee whose name might be on the list, the immediate exposure is not the site itself. It is that anyone reading it can take your name and look up where you live. That lookup does not require any technical skill, and it points strangers toward your home and the people in it.

The federal Lieu Act covers federal judges only. There is no current federal statute that lets other federal officers force broker removal the way New Jersey's Daniel's Law lets covered NJ officers and judges sue. Until S. 1952 or a successor passes, the defensive layer is continuous removal across the commercial sites that list residences by name. Frontline Privacy files those opt-out requests and keeps checking for records that come back.

For more on the doxxing chain and which sites matter most, see /doxxing and /data-brokers.