After anti-ICE protesters in Minneapolis took FBI documents from government vehicles, including rosters with agents' home addresses and contact information, a Schaumburg, Illinois man used that data to threaten an FBI special agent and reference his family. Jose Alberto Ramirez, 28, was charged in early February 2026 with transmitting a threat.
What happened
CWB Chicago reported on February 2, 2026 that a January 7, 2026 fatal shooting by an ICE agent in Minneapolis drew large protests. During one, FBI evidence technicians left the scene on foot for their safety, and their government vehicles were ransacked. Among the items taken were firearms, FBI identification and building-access badges, and rosters listing employees' phone numbers, email addresses, and home addresses.
Federal prosecutors say Jose Alberto Ramirez, 28, of Schaumburg, Illinois, used information from the stolen material to threaten one of the agents. According to the complaint, the agent received threatening messages from roughly two dozen senders on his work phone, and some referenced the agent's parents and children. Ramirez was arrested in early February 2026, charged with transmitting a threat, and held pending an extradition hearing to face the charge in Minnesota.
How the exposure worked
The theft put the agents' own contact details and home addresses into a threat actor's hands in a single document. It also opened a path to the agents' families: the threatening messages named the targeted agent's parents and children.
A roster lists an employee. It does not, by itself, map out that employee's parents, adult children, and where they live. That mapping is what data brokers sell. Broker profiles tie a person to relatives, past addresses, and a current home address, compiled from public records and commercial sources. When a name leaks, those profiles are the next place a threat actor looks.
Why this case matters
This case shows how fast a leaked internal document becomes a charged threat: the messages here started within hours, and charges followed within about a month.
It also shows the limit of securing documents alone. The roster was one source. The information used to reach the agent's family sits on commercial broker sites that exist for every federal agent, whether or not any roster ever leaks.
What this means for you
If your name could appear on an agency roster, as an FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE, or other federal officer, this case shows what a leak can turn into. Federal judges can invoke a federal privacy law to force removal of their home address; see the Lieu Act. Federal agents have no equivalent federal statute. State broker-removal laws such as New Jersey's Daniel's Law differ on who they cover, and coverage of federal officers is not uniform.
The layer you can control is broker removal: taking your home address and your family's information off the commercial sites that resell it, and keeping it off as listings reappear. Frontline Privacy files opt-outs across the data broker sites that list home addresses and keeps checking and refiling when your information comes back.
For more on how leaked names get turned into home addresses, see /doxxing and /data-brokers.
What reduces this risk
The threats in this case began within hours of the theft. The roster exposed the agents' own contact details and home addresses. Reaching the agent's parents and children took more: relatives and their addresses linked together on commercial data broker profiles, compiled from public records. Federal agents have no federal removal statute like the one that covers federal judges, and state broker-removal laws differ on whether they reach federal officers. Broker removal is the layer you can control. Frontline Privacy files opt-outs across the data broker sites that list home addresses and keeps checking and refiling when your information reappears.