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Doxxing

Schaumburg, IL man charged with threatening FBI agent using stolen agent roster (February 2026)

FILE 845Schaumburg, Illinois2026-02-02
ACTIVE

After anti-ICE protesters in Minneapolis allegedly stole an FBI agent roster containing contact information, a Schaumburg, Illinois man used that data to contact and threaten an FBI special agent. He was charged in February 2026. The case is one of the first federal threat prosecutions tied directly to a stolen roster.

What happened

According to [CWB Chicago's February 2, 2026 reporting](https://cwbchicago.com/2026/02/suburban-threatened-fbi-agent-after-protesters-stole-agent-roster-contact-info-in-minneapolis-feds.html), anti-ICE protesters at the scene of a Minneapolis incident allegedly stole an FBI agent roster containing contact information for federal agents assigned to the field office. The roster was reportedly removed from FBI vehicles left at the scene. A Schaumburg, Illinois man subsequently used information from the roster to contact and threaten an FBI special agent. Federal authorities charged him in early February 2026 with transmitting threats. The case was pending as of April 2026.

What happened

CWB Chicago reported on February 2, 2026 that anti-ICE protesters at the scene of a Minneapolis incident allegedly stole an FBI agent roster containing contact information for federal agents assigned to the field office. The roster was taken from FBI vehicles at the scene.

A Schaumburg, Illinois man used information from the stolen roster to contact and threaten an FBI special agent. Federal authorities charged him in early February 2026 with transmitting threats. The case was pending as of April 2026.

How it started

Two failure modes lined up. The first was the operational moment — vehicles at an active incident scene from which a roster could be removed. The second was that the roster carried agent contact data in a single document, which made the consequences of the theft immediate.

The roster in this case gave the suspect the starting point. Once a name and contact channel are in hand, the next step in any escalation — finding a home address — runs through the same broker pages that any threat actor would query against any officer. The roster theft accelerated the chain. It did not invent a new chain.

Why this case matters

This is a clean case study in how a single upstream failure converts into a federal threat prosecution within weeks. The roster was the spark. The downstream channels — phone, address, family — are the same ones that exist for every federal agent on every day.

It is also one of the first cases to come out of the post-2025 ICE-protest cycle in which a stolen agency document was directly tied to a charged threat against a named federal officer.

What this means for you

If you're an FBI agent, ATF, DEA, ICE, or any federal field officer whose name might appear on an agency roster, the Schaumburg case is the worst-case answer to "what happens when an internal document leaks." The federal Lieu Act covers judges only. Federal LE has no statutory equivalent.

The defensive layer is broker removal across every commercial site that resells residences by name. When a roster gets out, removal is what shortens the chain between the leaked name and the front door. We file opt-outs across 200+ broker sites and re-run them when the listings come back.

For more on the doxxing chain and which sites matter most, see /doxxing and /data-brokers.


Editorial rules: Only public, already-reported incidents. Never name a non-public victim. Always end with the prevention takeaway tied to our service. Cite at minimum one public source per claim.

What would have prevented this

Stolen rosters get used. The window from theft to threat in this case was weeks, not months. The roster gave the suspect a starting point — the agent's name and contact data. Anything beyond that, including the home address that drives most family-targeting attempts, comes from the same broker pages that resell residences for any sworn officer. Federal LE has no equivalent of the [Lieu Act](/laws/lieu-act), which covers federal judges. State [Daniel's Law](/laws/daniels-law) analogs vary on whether they cover federal officers in Illinois. The defensive layer that closes the second step regardless of what gets stolen upstream is continuous broker removal across every commercial channel that lists residences. We file opt-outs across 200+ broker sites and re-run them every two weeks.

Public sources