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Family targeting

NYPD officer Justin D'Amico's home address tweeted by Erica Garner on Christmas Day 2014

FILE 152New York, New York2014-12-25
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Erica Garner tweeted the home address of NYPD officer Justin D'Amico, who was involved in her father Eric Garner's 2014 death, along with addresses for five possible relatives. The tweet documented an early example of social-media-driven officer doxxing tied to a high-profile police-killing case.

What happened

On December 25, 2014, Erica Garner — daughter of Eric Garner, who died during a 2014 NYPD arrest in Staten Island — posted a tweet that included the home address of NYPD officer Justin D'Amico. D'Amico had been involved in the 2014 encounter and was named in the related civil and disciplinary record. The same tweet listed addresses for five additional people identified as possible D'Amico relatives. The NYPD confirmed it was looking into the post. Erica Garner died in December 2017 of a heart attack at age 27. The Christmas Day 2014 tweet remained one of the earliest documented cases of social-media-driven officer doxxing tied to a viral police-killing incident.

What happened

On December 25, 2014, Erica Garner posted a tweet that included the home address of NYPD officer Justin D'Amico. D'Amico had been involved in the July 2014 arrest of her father Eric Garner in Staten Island, the encounter that ended in Eric Garner's death. The tweet also listed addresses for five additional people identified as possible D'Amico relatives.

The NYPD confirmed it was reviewing the post. Erica Garner died in December 2017.

This page documents the doxxing event. It does not take a position on the underlying 2014 arrest, the grand-jury outcome, or the federal civil-rights review that followed. Both sides of that case have been reported extensively elsewhere.

How it started

The address-finding step ran through public channels available to anyone with an internet connection. Officer D'Amico's name was already public — it appeared in court filings, civil-suit documents, and news coverage of the 2014 arrest. From there, converting the name into a current home address required nothing more than a query against the same people-search broker pages that aggregate voter rolls, property records, and adjacent public sources.

The five additional addresses for possible relatives are the part of the case worth a closer look. Broker pages routinely list relatives next to the searched person on the same result page. Search D'Amico, get D'Amico plus five linked names with their addresses. The relative-listing field is built into the broker data model. It's the same field that exposes families of officers to family-vector lookups in every comparable case.

Why this case matters

The Christmas Day 2014 Garner tweet is one of the earliest documented social-media-amplified officer doxxings tied to a viral police-killing case. The pattern that recurred through 2020, 2024, and 2025 was already visible in 2014: name surfaces in a high-attention case, followers run the broker lookup, addresses get republished on social platforms, the household becomes reachable in minutes.

The relatives angle is the part that should land hardest. Five household-adjacent addresses came back from a search on one officer. That is the family-vector exposure pattern that runs against every sworn cop, sheriff, prosecutor, and judge whose name lands in a news cycle, regardless of which side a reader takes on the underlying case.

What this means for you

If you're an NYPD officer, or any sworn officer whose name appears in a viral case, the Garner timeline is the working template for what happens in the days that follow. The triggering event is public attention. The mechanism is the standard broker stack. The addresses for your relatives come back on the same query.

New York has no Daniel's Law analog. The state's public-records law gives officers limited disclosure protection on the agency side; it does not reach broker pages. The structural fix is continuous removal across every commercial site that resells residence by name, for the officer and for the household.

For more on the family-vector exposure shape, see /threats/family-targeting and /law-enforcement/families.


Editorial rules: Only public, already-reported incidents. Never name a non-public victim. Always end with the prevention takeaway tied to our service. Cite at minimum one public source per claim.

What would have prevented this

The addresses Garner posted came from public-records and people-search channels — the same channels that turn any sworn officer's name into a home address in seconds. The tweet was the visible event. The lookup that produced the data ran through the standard broker stack. Continuous broker removal is what shortens the chain between a name in the news and an address on a screen. We file across 200+ broker sites and re-file when the listings come back.

Public sources