FRONTLINEPRIVACY
Swatting

Federal judge swatting wave (January 2024) — Chutkan, Engoron, and others

2024-01-07·Washington DC, New York, and other US locations

In January 2024, a wave of swatting incidents targeted federal and state judges, prosecutors, and other public officials connected to high-profile cases. The pattern was widely reported and prompted federal action on judicial security.

What happened

Beginning on Christmas Day 2023 with an attempted swatting of Special Counsel Jack Smith, a wave of swatting incidents continued into January 2024, targeting public officials connected to active legal proceedings. On January 7, 2024, police and fire trucks responded to a fake shooting report at the Washington DC home of US District Judge Tanya Chutkan, who was presiding over the federal election interference case against former President Trump. On January 11, 2024, Nassau County police responded to a bomb threat at the home of New York Justice Arthur Engoron, the same day he was presiding over closing arguments in the $370 million civil fraud trial against Trump. Maine Secretary of State Shenna Bellows, several state attorneys general, and at least one federal cabinet member were also targeted in related incidents over the same period. Federal prosecutors charged a Florida resident in May 2024 with placing dozens of swatting calls targeting public officials nationwide.

What happened

In late December 2023 and through January 2024, a coordinated wave of swatting incidents targeted public officials connected to high-profile legal proceedings — federal judges, state judges, prosecutors, secretaries of state, and others.

Documented incidents included Special Counsel Jack Smith (Christmas Day 2023), US District Judge Tanya Chutkan in DC (January 7, 2024), New York Justice Arthur Engoron (January 11, 2024), Maine Secretary of State Shenna Bellows (December 29, 2023), and several state attorneys general and other federal officials. None of the targets were physically injured in the documented incidents, but each response carried the risk profile of an actual armed law-enforcement engagement at the official's home.

How it started

Each documented swatting required two things: the home address of the official, and a means of placing an anonymous call to local emergency services. Both were trivially available. The home addresses of federal judges, state judges, and senior elected officials were — and largely still are — reachable through commercial data brokers, public property records, and adjacent public sources, regardless of whether those officials had filed under existing privacy statutes.

The federal Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act (the Lieu Act) had been signed into law in December 2022, two years before the wave. Some affected federal judges had enrolled in the AOUSC removal program; others had not. Compliance from data brokers was inconsistent and re-listing was common.

A Florida resident was federally charged in May 2024 in connection with dozens of the swatting calls, though the broader pattern of coordinated swatting of officials continued through 2024 and into 2025.

What this means for you

The 2024 wave isn't unique — it's one well-documented chapter in an ongoing pattern. For any official whose work makes enemies (judges, prosecutors, federal LE, state AGs, election administrators), the data-finding step that enables swatting is the part that's been engineered to be cheap.

If you're a federal judge: enroll in the AOUSC removal program under the Lieu Act. If you're a state judge in NJ (under Daniel's Law — the state statute that lets covered judges and officers sue data brokers for failing to remove a home address) or in IL with its Judicial Privacy Act: file the demands. For everyone else (and as a belt-and-suspenders layer alongside the formal programs): continuous broker cleanup closes the gap the legal mechanisms can't reach on their own.

For more on the swatting threat shape, see /swatting. For specifically who Daniel's Law and similar state statutes cover, see /laws/daniels-law.


Editorial rules: Only public, already-reported incidents. Never name a non-public victim. Always end with the prevention takeaway tied to our service. Cite at minimum one public source per claim.

What would have prevented this

The 2024 wave was operationally trivial. The swatters didn't need state secrets — every targeted official's home address was already reachable through publicly available channels and broker pages. The federal Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act (the Lieu Act, 2022) gives federal judges grounds to force broker removal. State court judges in NJ and IL have analog protections. Running the removals — and re-running them when the address re-lists — is what makes the legal mechanism deliver.

Public sources