Privacy in Wisconsin for first responders

What protects you in Wisconsin

Wisconsin's strongest protection is written for judges. 2023 Wisconsin Act 235, codified at Wis. Stat. §757.07, lets judicial officers and their immediate family require data brokers, agencies, and online publishers to stop posting their personal information. The covered list includes home address, personal phone number, personal email, Social Security number, driver's license number, and vehicle plate. A broker has to stop within 10 business days of a written request, and a judicial officer can sue for damages if it refuses. Wisconsin modeled this on New Jersey's Daniel's Law, the state law that lets covered officials sue brokers that keep publishing their home address.

The judicial protection reaches past broker listings. Wis. Stat. §59.43(1r) makes the county register of deeds shield specifically identified property records when a judge asks in writing, so a deed no longer maps a judge to a home. Wis. Stat. §8.10(7) lets a judicial officer running for office keep their home address off their nomination papers and declaration of candidacy. Federal judges who sit in Wisconsin have one more tool: the federal Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act (Lieu Act) lets them and their families demand removal of their personal information from brokers and agencies. It covers federal judges only. Together these give Wisconsin judges layered protection: broker takedowns, deed shielding, and candidacy-filing confidentiality.

Every other first responder gets less. Wisconsin's public-records law does withhold some information: under Wis. Stat. §19.36(10) and (11), an agency will not release the home address, personal phone number, personal email, or Social Security number of a public employee or public office holder without their consent. That covers sworn officers, firefighters, and EMS as public employees. One carve-out matters: the exemption does not reach the home address of anyone who holds elective public office, so an elected sheriff's address can still be released under this law. And it only binds government agencies. It gives you no right to make a data broker take anything down. That affirmative removal right belongs to judges alone.

Two more pieces fill out the map. The federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act limits when the DMV can release personal information from your driver and vehicle records. And the state's Safe at Home address confidentiality program, under Wis. Stat. §165.68, gives victims of domestic abuse, stalking, sexual assault, and trafficking a substitute address to use in place of their real one. Safe at Home participants can also register as confidential voters under Wis. Stat. §6.47, which keeps their address off the poll lists used at polling places. Safe at Home is built around those victims, not around the job, so most officers will not qualify on the strength of their work alone.

What still leaks

State law stops at the government's own records. It does not reach the data broker sites that carry most of the exposure.

1. The judge-versus-everyone-else gap. If you are a sworn officer, firefighter, or EMS, you do not have §757.07's removal right. You can keep your home address out of many public records, but you cannot force a broker to delist it.
2. Property records for non-judges. §59.43(1r) shields a judge's deed. Other officers have no equivalent right, so a recorded property document can still tie your name to your address.
3. Out-of-state brokers. Spokeo, Whitepages, and similar sites do not follow Wisconsin law. They pull from national sources and republish, and a state agency withholding your address does nothing to the copy a broker already sold.

Laws that work for you here

• Wis. Stat. §757.07 (2023 Wisconsin Act 235): judicial officers can require brokers, agencies, and publishers to stop posting listed personal information, and can sue for damages if they refuse. Covers current and former judges, court commissioners, and their immediate family.
• Wis. Stat. §19.36(10) and (11): agencies withhold the home address, personal phone number, personal email, and Social Security number of public employees unless the person consents. The home-address exemption does not cover someone holding elective public office, such as an elected sheriff.
• Wis. Stat. §59.43(1r): the register of deeds shields specifically identified property records on a judicial officer's written request.
• Wis. Stat. §8.10(7): a judicial officer running for office can keep their home address off nomination papers and the declaration of candidacy.
• Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act (Lieu Act) (federal): lets federal judges and their families demand removal of their personal information from data brokers and agencies. Federal judges only.
• Driver's Privacy Protection Act (federal): limits when the DMV may release personal information from your driver and vehicle records.
• Wis. Stat. §165.68 (Safe at Home): a substitute-address program for victims of domestic abuse, stalking, sexual assault, and trafficking. Not tied to the job. Participants can register as confidential voters under §6.47, keeping their address off poll lists.

What we do that the state doesn't

Section 757.07 is real leverage if you are a judge. If you are a sworn officer, firefighter, or EMS, the state framework keeps your address out of government files but leaves the broker layer open, and that is where most of the exposure sits. Brokers publish first and do not run any Wisconsin agency's process.

We find your listings across the people-search sites that publish home addresses, phone numbers, relatives, and property records, then file opt-out and removal requests on the ones we find. Listings come back when brokers refresh from their sources, so we keep checking and refile when yours reappears. We handle most of the process and tell you when a site needs something from you.

Breaches feed that broker layer directly. The 2025 Bell Ambulance breach at Wisconsin's largest ambulance provider exposed Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, and medical records for 237,830 people. Public reporting has focused on the patients Bell transported; the company has not said whether its own EMTs' and paramedics' records were in the stolen data. Either way, data like that circulates and lands on profile pages. Removal at the broker layer is the part that reaches you.

See what's exposed