Privacy in Colorado for first responders
What state law protects, what still leaks, and what we sweep beyond it.
C.R.S. §18-9-313 anti-doxxing + protected-persons internet redaction (treble damages), HB25-1195 voter.
Address Confidentiality Program
Colorado maintains a state-level program that lets eligible officers, judges, and other protected workers use a substitute address for public records.
Apply or learn more →Public-records carve-outs
- Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-9-313 (removal request): peace officers, firefighters, judges, prosecutors, public defenders, code enforcement officers, health-care workers, educators, and other protected persons can send a written request asking a state or local government official to stop publishing their personal information in internet records. The same framework reaches county recorder, assessor, and treasurer records.
- Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-9-313 (anti-doxxing): a class 1 misdemeanor to knowingly post a protected person's personal information online when it poses an imminent and serious threat to that person or their immediate family.
- HB25-1195 (2025): first responders and their spouses can ask a county clerk to keep their address confidential in voter registration records.
Applicable laws
What protects you in Colorado
Colorado's main tool is Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-9-313. It does two things.
First, it lets you get your personal information off government records published online. If you are a peace officer, firefighter, judge, prosecutor, public defender, code enforcement officer, or health-care worker, you can send a written request to the state or local agency that holds the record. The request needs your full name and home address, proof that you are a protected person, and an affirmation, under penalty of perjury, that publishing the information poses an imminent and serious threat to you or your family. Once the agency has that request, it stops publishing your personal information online. The same framework reaches county recorder, assessor, and treasurer records, which is where your home address and property details usually sit.
Second, the same statute makes doxxing a crime. Knowingly posting a protected person's home address or other personal information online, when it poses an imminent and serious threat, is a class 1 misdemeanor. That carries up to 364 days in jail and a fine of up to $1,000.
The criminal side has been used. In April 2026, a Denver jury convicted an activist under §18-9-313 for reading a Denver police commander's home address aloud on a livestream and urging people to gather at his home. It was the first conviction under the statute. Read the case at /incidents/denver-police-commander-doxxing-2025.
Three more Colorado protections back that up:
- Voter registration: under HB25-1195, passed in 2025, first responders and their spouses can ask a county clerk to keep their address confidential in voter registration records.
- Address Confidentiality Program: the state ACP (Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-30-2101 et seq.) gives survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking a substitute address. It is built around those victim categories, not the job, so you qualify only if your situation fits one of them.
- Driver and vehicle records: the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act limits how Colorado's DMV can share the personal information on your license and registration. It restricts the DMV, not the brokers.
What still leaks
- Data brokers. Spokeo, Whitepages, BeenVerified, and similar sites do not follow Colorado law. They pull from national aggregators and commercial feeds, so a removal at a Colorado agency does not reach them.
- Court filings. Civil filings often list your home address. The §18-9-313 request reaches agency records online, not court filings. Redacting a court record is a separate motion.
- The threshold. The removal request requires an affirmation of an imminent and serious threat. Not every situation will meet that standard in writing.
What we handle
State law covers the agencies and gives prosecutors a tool against doxxing. Neither one reaches the broker pages that resell your address to anyone with a credit card. We do.
We find the people-search and data-broker listings that show your home address, phone number, and relatives, file opt-outs on the ones we find, and keep checking, because these listings come back. We handle most of the process and tell you clearly when a site needs something from you, such as an ID.
Your home address is what connects a stranger to your front door and to the people who live there. Getting it off the broker sites is the part the state cannot do for you.