State of officer privacy 2026
Data broker sites publish home addresses, phone numbers, relatives, and property records for first responders across the country. State privacy laws are supposed to limit that. A published home address is a path from the job to the front door, and to the family living there. This report tracks how well the laws actually work. The full data set is still in development. What follows is our framework, what we're measuring, and what public records and current litigation already show. We'll publish the complete data once the methodology holds up to independent review.
How we measure this
We scan a sample of first responders across roles (law enforcement, fire, EMS, dispatch, and corrections), states, and metro areas. For each person we record which sites list them, what personal details each site exposes, and whether a removed listing comes back, and how fast. We publish the sample composition with the full report. We do not publish the raw records, because that data would itself expose the people in the study.
What the public record already shows
One point is already clear: shielding disclosure by government agencies and changing data broker behavior are two different problems. New Jersey's Daniel's Law is the sharpest test. It lets covered public servants, including law enforcement officers, judges, and prosecutors, and their families, demand that data brokers stop publishing their home address and unpublished home phone number. Brokers have a 10-business-day window to comply, and covered people can sue. Atlas Data Privacy has filed more than 100 lawsuits under the law on behalf of roughly 20,000 New Jersey officers and other covered people. That litigation is the main force pushing measurable broker compliance, and it is still moving through the courts. A pending reform bill would extend the compliance window, so confirm the current deadline before relying on it. Frontline Privacy files these removal requests with the brokers for readers the law covers.
What state shields reach, and what they miss
Most state protections limit what government agencies disclose, not what data brokers publish. California Government Code section 6254.21 bars agencies from posting an official's home address or phone number online, and lets peace officers, judges, and others demand that a private site take it down within 48 hours. Frontline Privacy files removal requests with those sites when a reader qualifies. Texas Government Code section 552.117 keeps a current or retired peace officer's home address and phone number out of public records; you file that exemption with your agency, and Frontline Privacy handles the broker opt-outs around it. Both close the agency path. Neither, on its own, stops people-search sites from rebuilding a profile out of other public data. New Jersey's private right of action is the exception that reaches brokers directly. Per-state numbers ship with the full report.
How brokers actually behave
A handful of large people-search sites account for much of the exposure in our sample so far, which is subject to revision as the full data set comes in. They include Spokeo, Whitepages, BeenVerified, TruePeopleSearch, and Radaris. Compliance with removal law varies widely between them. Some honor Daniel's Law demands inside the 10-business-day window. Others are slower or do not respond, which is what the New Jersey litigation is testing. For this report, we track which brokers move toward compliance and which do not. Separately, the Frontline Privacy product finds your personal information on these sites, files removal requests, and keeps checking for it to come back, re-filing when a listing returns.
What to do about it
For individuals: file your state's public-records confidentiality program or exemption if you qualify, then run continuous broker opt-outs. The state filing closes the agency disclosure path. Broker opt-outs address the people-search sites around it. For departments and unions: covering sworn members in bulk produces auditable improvement you can track over time. For policymakers: a private right of action against data brokers, on the Daniel's Law model, has the clearest track record of moving broker behavior. Agency-side shields alone do not reach the brokers.